But maybe I get privacy wrong.

such that only the client and app server can see plaintext, and the relay sees only a jumble of ciphertext. A “gateway” sits between the relay and app server to handle all of this cryptography — decapsulating requests, encapsulating responses — and the app server handles only plain HTTP

Wouldn't that be better if you design an oblivious encryption method so the encryption and decryption is handled by the origin server (a.k.a Target Resource in the RFC) and the Client? Instead of letting anyone in the middle to handle that data?

Their current design looked not that different than if you just connect to a public anonymous SOCKS5 server (which don't decrypt TLS traffic) and uses it to connect to a website hosted behind Cloudflare. It would probably work the same way too, since someone has to host a "OHTTP Relay" the same way they host a anonymous SOCKS5 server.

There’s also room for a privacy-centric analytics offering

https://github.com/scosman/Biscotti

Meanwhile, some app developers end up knowing more about their users than they’d care to: a typical client-server exchange creates a trail of user data, like the client’s IP address or TLS fingerprint. This level of visibility can be a burden.

Can someone expand on “burden” here? Scenarios that come to mind for me are something like: “I now need to ensure my log files are stored securely but that’s a PITA.” This doesn’t feel like the best example of why I’d use this though. (Edit: Secure messaging servers for a service like Signal?)

Customers will be able to enable our new OHTTP Gateway as a paid add-on to their zone and start receiving OHTTP traffic with just a few clicks.

I love to see privacy improvement in tech. However I do wonder at this. Cloudflare is obviously a business and can't do everything for free, but charging extra for websites to add privacy Seems like a poor incentive if the goal is to improve privacy generally

But that aside - surely this won't help for websites with Google tracking code embedded, which are the sorts of sites that track you anyway?

What about browsers making general website requests to services that support it?

I respect customer privacy. But I also need to know who is abusing my platforms as well. The balance here is very difficult to manage, now that we have entire agentic platforms capable of deploying highly technical capable "abuse" platforms.

a typical client-server exchange creates a trail of user data, like the client’s IP address or TLS fingerprint. This level of visibility can be a burden.

Does Cloudflare's WAF (which relies on TLS Fingerprinting) stop working if OHTTP is enabled? If not, does this imply the client metadata is read and processed by Cloudflare but not passed on to the application server?

Flo Health

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2021/06/...

https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1923133/fl...

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/192_3133_fl...

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-reportedly-received-se...

https://www.labaton.com/cases/frasco-v-flo-health-inc

https://natlawreview.com/article/jury-finds-meta-liable-coll...

1789644223 | Frasco v. Flo Health 3:21-cv-00757-JD Wiretap liability, Meta Platforms [pdf] | https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-3_21-cv-00... | https://smackernews.com/item/49739197 HN | 0 comments

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/flo-health-p...

Apple Private Cloud Compute

Unlocking Apple's Private Cloud Compute: An Analysis of Privacy-Preserving Artificial Intelligence

Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec 2026)

https://arxiv.org/html/2605.24239v1

"While most of the PCC system specifications are public, compiled binaries add a layer of opaqueness. There are no reproducible builds, and there are no symbols within those binaries, creating potential discrepancies between the specification and what is shipped to the user."

"Researchers have previously opened other proprietary Apple interfaces, such as AirDrop, Apple Watch, iCloud Private Relay, satellite communication, and more (Stute et al., 2019; Rollshausen et al., 2025; Kiesel and Classen, 2025; Classen et al., 2025). These works repeatedly show that, even though Apple makes significant efforts to secure its systems and add privacy features, the lack of public research leads to trivial mistakes that cause severe shortcomings in user privacy and security."

For example, iCloud Private Relay

https://www.bloomberglaw.com/api/v1/public/download/X2K9PC2C...

1744651630 | macOS Sends Locally-Served DNS Zones to iCloud Private Relay | https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/780720 | https://smackernews.com/item/43683780 HN | 1 comment

1776183767 | iCloud Private Relay is not secure | https://webrtchacks.com/apples-not-so-private-relay-fails-wi... | https://smackernews.com/item/47767673 HN | 1 comment

1785886306 | IP and DNS Leaks in WebKit Affecting Proxy Browsers and iCloud Private Relay | https://mysk.blog/2026/08/04/webkit-proxy-icloud-private-rel... | https://smackernews.com/item/49176697 HN | 43 comments

1785949588 | iCloud Private Relay leaks real IP addresses | https://proton.me/blog/icloud-private-relay-ip-leak | https://smackernews.com/item/49185697 HN | 1 comment

1785952050 | Apple's 'Private Relay' Is Exposing Users' Real IP Addresses | https://www.404media.co/apples-private-relay-is-exposing-use... | https://smackernews.com/item/49186320 HN | 1 comment